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BSTRACT : With the advent and the rising popularity of Internet,
security is becoming one of the focal point. At present, Web sites have
become the attacker’s main target. The attackers uses the strategy of
embedding the HTML tags, the script tag to include Web-based Trojan
scripting or redirector scripting, the embedded object tag which activates
the third-party applications to display the embedded object and the
advanced strategy is the ARP spoofing method to build malicious website
when the attackers cannot gain control of the target website. The attacker
hijacks the traffic, then injects the malicious code into the HTML
responses to achieve virtual malicious websites. The malicious code
embedded in the web pages by the attackers; change the display mode of
the corresponding HTML tags and the respective effects invisible to the
browser users. The display feature setting of embedded malicious code is
detected by the abnormal visibility recognition technique which increases
efficiency and reduces maintenance cost. Inclusion of the honey client
increases the malicious website detection rate and speed. Most of the
malicious Web pages are hence detected efficiently and the malicious code
in the source code is located accurately. It can also handle End-User
requests to know whether their webpage is free of Malicious codes or not.
KEYWORDS
Abnormal visibility, Attacker’s mechanism, Malicious Websites,
Detection mechanism, Honey client, JavaScript interpreting.

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the increased usage of Web application, Websites have
become the attackers’ main target. Nearly one third of the
Web sites contain malicious code. Malicious codes are pieces
of code that can affect the secrecy, the integrity, the
data, control flow and the functionality of a system.
Therefore, their detection is a major concern within the
computer science community as well as within the user
community.
Web sites containing the malicious code generated by
JavaScript has accounted in large numbers. When the users
access the Web pages containing malicious code with any
Web browser, some mal operations are performed by the
system. The proposed system can interpret and execute
scripts efficiently and detects the malicious codes generated
by scripts, especially the encoded scripts.
The attackers while embedding Trojan horses in the Web
pages can change the display mode of the corresponding tags
in the Web pages. Therefore, some feature was added to the
existing system to describe the display feature detection of
malicious web pages.
This system uses Web spider and HTML parser to fetch and
parse the Web pages from target site. The system parse the
codes of the Web pages and convert them into the data
structures which is easily recognized by the detection engine,
further matching these structures with the abnormal visibility
fingerprints and locating the malicious codes in the source
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codes of pages accurately and efficiently. The maintenance of
these finger prints is very low. The finger print library can
be updated by defining new ones for further development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes related work. Section 3 gives the mechanisms in
malicious websites. Section 4 describes the malicious website
detection methods. Section 5 gives the experimental results,
section 6 concludes this paper and section 7 shows the
references.
RELATED WORKS
VeriWeb detects the executable paths of Web sites which
can be exploited by attackers. It can analyze JavaScript
scripts using string matching. However, it can hardly match
all sort of scripts used to embed malicious codes, especially
encoded scripts. [M. Benedikt et al., 2002]. Intrusiondetection is performed by attacking behavior pattern
matching, which mines the server logging in real time [M.
Almgren et al., 2000 ]. New signatures have to be built for
different sites. Honey Monkeys is costly and slow [Y. Wang
et al., 2006 ] and HoneyC is also based on signatures of
malicious codes. [C. Seifert et al., 2007 ] Both are based on
Honey Pot technique. The crawler based system in [A.
Moshchuk et al., 2006 ] and Monkey- Spider [A. Ikinci.,
2008] download possible malicious pages to local machines
scan them with anti-virus software’s. However special
conditions cannot be resolved and timely updations cannot be
obtained. StopBadWare.org [http://www.StopBadWare.org.]
is an organization established to detect malicious Web sites.
A product called Sucop also detects malicious Web pages
[http://www.sucop.com/]. Various anti-virus software’s can
also detect the malicious codes passively at browser-end.
HTML Parser is a tool which parses the malicious codes of
the web pages [http://htmlparser.sourceforge.net/].
All the above works are based on the virus
signature,
resulting in the large quantity of maintenance and the
disadvantages of update. The methods based on the virus
signature can’t be with high performance because of string
matching.
MECHANISMS IN MALICIOUS WEBSITES
The victims who visit the malicious websites will be
redirected and exploited by the Web-based Trojans,
implemented in scripting languages including JavaScript.
Strategies for Redirecting Visitors to Web-based
Trojans
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To redirect the visitors to the actual Web-based Trojan,
attackers are typically using one of the following three
categories of strategies.
Embedded HTML Tags : Embedded HTML tags such as
iframe, frame, and others, are used to embed the Web-based
Trojan into the source code of the website. The aim of this
HTML element is to create an inline frame that displays
another document. When that page is opened, the included
document is displayed in the inline frame. Thus attackers
take advantage of this to include the Web-based Trojan
directly, setting the iframe to be invisible by setting the
height or width of the iframe to zero or a very small value,
for example:
<iframe src="URL to Trojan" width="0" height="0"
frameborder="0"></iframe>
Trojan horse : Trojan horse attacks are accomplished by
inserting malicious code into other people's programs. When
the user executes their program, they unintentionally execute
the Trojan horse program. Trojan horse programs may be
used by criminals to commit fraud, embezzlement, sabotage
and espionage. Many current web sites insert a small piece of
code like a cookie into your browser file, which may contain
a Trojan horse.
Malicious Scripts : The second category uses the script tag
to include Web-based Trojan scripting or redirector scripting,
which are often XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerabilities.
Embedded Objects : The third category of strategies is
based on the embedded object tag for activating third-party
applications like Flash or Baofeng media player or Browser
Helper Objects to display the embedded object. When
vulnerabilities in these applications and BHOs are found,
attackers then use this strategy to inject the objects to the
vulnerable applications, which exploit them in order to
remotely execute code on the victim’s machine.
ARP Spoofing : This is another advanced strategy to build
malicious website when the attackers cannot gain control of
the target website. The attacker uses ARP spoofing in order
to act as a Man-in-the-Middle, and hijacks all of the traffic
from and to the victims in the same Ethernet subnet. The
attacker then injects malicious code into the HTML
responses from the target website, or all of the web traffic, to
achieve virtual malicious websites.
DETECTION METHODS
Malicious code hidden in the websites is detected by the
following ways:
•
Reactive detection
•
Automatic detection
•
Proactive detection
•
Infrastructure based detection
•
Abnormal visibility recognition detection.

Integrated
approach

Fig. 1. Malicious website detection architecture

An integrated approach of using honey client with the
abnormal visibility recognition detection is chosen so as to
increase the malicious website detection rate and speed along
with the increased performance and efficiency.
Spider : It automatically detects the malicious Web pages in
Web sites. It starts crawling from an initial URL, fetches the
HTML source code of the page and extracts the related link
URLs. The contents are then fed to HTML parser.
HTML Parser : During the extraction and detection
process, the tags in HTML pages should be represented in a
well-formed structure format. A Java HTML parsing library
is used for implementation. A class by name IFrameTag is
implemented for parsing iframe tags. The parser converts the
HTML codes to the linked list structure of tags.
JavaScript Engine : It consists of a Rhino-based JavaScript
interpreter and some necessary simulation built-in objects.
The scripts extracted from the original Web page is fed to
the JavaScript engine which interprets and execute them.
The output data received by the built-in objects is integrated
with the HTML codes of original Web page and then fed to
the parser.
Honey client : Client honeypots are devices for detecting
malicious servers on a network. It generates a queue of
server requests, issues these requests to the servers one-byone and gets the response of the servers. After a response is
obtained, the client honeypot perform an analysis that
determines whether the server is malicious or benign. In this
system, by using the client honeypot, detection of malicious
websites are increased within a short time duration.
Abnormal visibility detector :
It is used to detect
abnormal visibility. The abnormal tag is determined by
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matching its attributes values with the abnormal visibility
fingerprints. For HTML codes, the detector will check the
width and height attributes of related HTML tags directly.
For JavaScript scripts, detection will be performed to the tags
after interpretation and execution. The width and height
values are compared with a threshold. If they are less than the
threshold, it is considered that there is an abnormal visibility
in the Web page and suspected as a malicious webpage. If the
display style of the iframe tags are set to “display: none”, the
width and height values are regarded as zero. The detection
will be carried out based on some abnormal visibility
fingerprints such as

It is inferred from the figure3 that the performance of the
proposed system is higher compared to Sucop. By including
the honey client in the detection method, the speed of large
number of malicious website detection can also be increased
in shorter time duration along with this high performance.
Accuracy rate of the malicious website detection can be
evaluated by using the following confusion matrix.
Table 1. Confusion Matrix

•
Abnormal width or height.
•
Abnormal display: none display style.
•
Abnormal iframe generated by scripts.
Sometimes websites may introduce invisible iframe tags for
normal application functions. To avoid false positive in such
cases, the detector considers only the invisible iframe tags
whose srcs link to external sites.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Using the system developed, various abnormal visibilities
are distributed as shown in the Fig.2.

Hence accuracy rate can be evaluated as follows.
Accuracy rate =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN

CONCLUSION
57%
20%

1.7%
iframe tags
Java script
Combining both
Others

22%

Fig. 2. Distribution of abnormal visibilities
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The results of the detection for the proposed system and the
Sucop are shown in the Fig.3 below.

After analyzing and viewing the statistics of web malicious
codes, an integrated approach of using honey client with an
abnormal visibility detection method is proposed to detect the
malicious websites effectively and efficiently. A system is
developed and implemented based on the integrated
approach. It shows that the system can detect the malicious
websites in an increased rate and speed along with the high
performance and less maintenance cost. It can detect almost
all the Web pages containing malicious codes and its
location. The system can also be used to track the security
state of the target websites and alarm the end users before
visiting the malicious Web pages.
Accuracy rate of the malicious website detection can be
evaluated using the confusion matrix.The Malicious Display
Style can be further improved by extending the abnormal
visibilty fingerprints. This can be done by adding new classes
that can detect the malicious codes in almost all the tags that
holds important data.
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